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One of the most challenging aspects of Anti-Submarine War-
fare (ASW) has been the detection and tracking of submerged 
contacts. One of the most successful means of achieving this goal 
was the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) developed by the 
United States Navy in the early 1950's. It was designed using 
breakthrough discoveries of the propagation paths of sound 
through water and intended to monitor the growing submarine 
threat of the Soviet Union. SOSUS provided cueing of transiting 
Soviet submarines to allow for optimal positioning of U.S. ASW 
forces for tracking and prosecution of these underwater threats. 
SOSUS took on an even greater national security role with the 
advent of submarine launched ballistic missiles, ensuring that U.S. 
forces were aware of these strategic liabilities in case hostilities 
were ever to erupt between the two superpowers. With the end of 
the Cold War, SOSUS has undergone a number of changes in its 
utilization, but is finding itself no less relevant as an asset against 
the growing number of modern quiet submarines proliferating 
around the world. 
 
Introduction 
For millennia, humans seeking to better defend themselves 
have set up observation posts along the ingress routes to their key 
strongholds. This could consist of something as simple as a person 
hidden in a tree, to extensive networks of towers communicating 





with signal fires. Regardless of the means, the goal was the same: 
to gain advanced notice of the approach of one's enemies to allow 
for defensive forces to be prepared in a timely manner. 
This strategy continues to hold today, though the technological 
means to do so are radically different. Many of our tools for long-
range observation are now based on orbiting satellites. Instead of 
keeping watch from a high tower, we use photographic reconnais-
sance. Instead of using signal fires for communication, we use 
radio signals that are relayed through satellites. However, one area 
of great concern with which satellites continue to have difficulty is 
the detection of submerged vessels approaching our shores.  
Since World War I, sonar has been used with varying degrees 
of success to detect submarines. By the end of World War II, it 
was considered the premier sensor to locate submarines that were 
able to stay below the surface of the ocean for longer periods of 
time. Keeping forces constantly at sea to maintain a continuous 
patrol, however, is expensive and very time consuming. A method 
was sought that could provide the detection capability of sonar 
without the prohibitive cost of seagoing time and resources. That 
method was the fixed sonar system, an array of hydrophones 
deployed along the ocean floor in strategic areas, designed to 
detect an enemy submarine as she either left her home waters or 
approached ours. These silent tripwires came to play a vital role in 
the rapid buildup and undersea forces of the 1950's and beyond. 
They still have an important role even today, as their capabilities 




The first sonar hydrophones, developed during World War I, 
could detect submarines from several miles away. However, self-
noise was a very limiting factor (and still is today to a lesser 
degree). These early convoy escorts had to come to a complete 
stop to be quiet enough to listen for an enemy submarine, greatly 
hampering their effectiveness in protecting a convoy. (Cote, 2003) 
Having seen the effectiveness of the lone submarine against 
commercial assets, the Royal Navy spent several years after the 





end of the war developing a new technology to aid in the detection 
of a single submarine at sea. This new development—called 
ASDIC—was one of the most closely guarded secrets of any 
military program at the time. The meaning of ASDIC is still 
debated, but could possibly mean Allied Submarine Detection 
Investigation Committee or Anti-Submarine Division Supersonics. 
ASDIC was the first active sonar and provided a step-jump 
improvement over earlier passive arrays by providing not only 
bearing to a contact, but also the range. 
Once the United States entered World War II, the British 
began sharing the technology behind their new secret asset. The 
United States used it to set up high frequency active sonar 
transducers—known as the Herald system—mounted on 
submerged tripods outside of several commercial ports. The 
Herald transducers were operated via cable run to nearby shore-
based stations. They could be trained as needed to detect and track 
a target. The Heralds also incorporated a magnetic tripwire 
detector that was a precursor to modern Magnetic Anomaly 
Detectors. (Gerken, 1986) 
 
Acoustic Research Makes Major Strides 
Further research into passive acoustic arrays and sound propa-
gation through the water, both during and after World War II, 
resulted in a breakthrough discovery. Maurice Ewing and J. Lamar 
Worzel located the presence of a deep-water sound channel that 
trapped and focused low frequency sound waves, allowing them to 
propagate over distances of thousands of miles. (Cote, 2003) At 
the direction of the Office of Naval Research, this Sound Fixing 
and Ranging (SOFAR) channel was exploited by Bell Labs in late 
1950 to begin development on the Sound Surveillance System 
(SOSUS). SOSUS was to be a vast network of seabed acoustic 
hydrophones that would utilize the characteristics of the SOFAR 
channel to detect submerged adversarial submarines at long 
ranges. 
Detecting contacts underwater, particularly from long range, is 
a difficult task given the interference of acoustic noise in the 
signal reaching the hydrophone being monitored. Two methods of 





improving the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) are antenna gain and 
processing gain. Given the relatively limited processing power of 
then-current computer technology, improvements in processing 
gain were difficult to achieve at the time. Antenna gain, however, 
was already being exploited in the design of the large hydrophone 
arrays being installed in the bows of hunter-killer submarines 
(SSKs). In addition, as the array length grew, the minimum 
frequency that could be detected also improved. This made 
SOSUS very well suited to aid in the detection of submarines at 
long distances. Its 1,000 foot long hydrophone arrays could detect 
even the lowest frequencies being generated by submarines at 
ranges of hundreds of miles. To maximize their low frequency 
detection capability, the SOSUS arrays were installed perpendicu-
lar to the expected direction of sound arriving from submarines 
transiting at the axis of the SOFAR channel. 
The realization that the broadband nature of the noise signa-
ture of submarines also contained measurable narrowband 
components led to the next step-increase in submarine detection 
capabilities. These narrowband components are usually associated 
with a particular piece of machinery, be it a pump, generator, or 
gearbox. Using a tunable set of frequency filters, these tonals 
could be picked out of the general signal being received by the 
array. The process of sorting out these narrowband tonals was 
termed Low Frequency Analysis and Ranging (LOFAR). LOFAR 
gave sonar array designers a way to dramatically improve the 
processing gain of their systems. As intelligence about adversarial 
submarine design improved, the aspect-dependent nature of many 
narrowband tonals could provide even more detailed information 
about a submarine's general direction of transit. It was later 
realized that these tonals can also act as a form of acoustic 
fingerprint for identifying a given class of submarine and 
sometimes even a specific boat. 
 
The Beginnings of the Network 
Bell Labs' first design for SOSUS – named Project Jezebel – 
was installed off the coast of Eleuthera, Bahamas in 1951. This 
test installation was so successful that 1952 saw the decision to 





install SOSUS arrays along the entire Eastern coastline of the U.S. 
Two years later, SOSUS arrays were planned along the Western 
coastline and in the waters surrounding Hawaii. These systems 
were completed and began operations in 1958. The next 
installation was completed in 1959 off the coast of Argentia, 
Newfoundland, demonstrating the incorporation of allied nations 
into the ever-expanding Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) detection 
network. 
In use, the detection network entailed a multi-stage process. 
The SOSUS arrays were connected to land-based Naval Facilities 
(NavFacs) that received and processed the acoustic information. 
The refined data was then passed to evaluation centers that 
incorporated other cueing sources, such as high-frequency 
direction-finding radars, to generate a submarine probability area 
(SPA). ASW forces were then directed to the SPA to attempt to 
gain local contact with the submarine. Completing this sequence 
of events entailed an inevitable time delay. It also suffered from a 
relatively high false alarm rate, adding further difficulty to the task 
of locating and tracking the target. (Cote, 2003) 
SOSUS Comes Into Its Own 
LOFAR was a great development in the ability to detect 
submarines. However, against diesel submarines, it was hampered 
by the fact that the target low frequency tonals were only emitted 
while the submarine was snorkeling. Thus, a sub could be tracked 
as it transited to its patrol area, but further localization was at the 
mercy of the sub's operating routine for recharging its batteries. 
The advent of nuclear power in submarines, though, showed the 
great potential of the SOSUS arrays. 
Nuclear submarines have numerous pieces of machinery 
supporting the operation of the reactor that are required to run at 
all times. The acoustic stealth of early nuclear designs was further 
compromised by the continued practice of mounting engineering 
equipment directly to the hull, as well as the use of traditional, but 
noisy, propeller designs. Their tell-tale narrowband tonals were a 
constant noise source while they were at sea, making them prime 
targets for SOSUS. SOSUS also helped to highlight the noisy 





signatures of the U.S. nuclear subs. The most noted example of 
this involved USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) as she 
transited for one of her first deterrent patrols in 1961. East coast 
SOSUS stations tracked her during her entire trip across the 
Atlantic Ocean to the United Kingdom. Another first in long 
distance detection was achieved in 1962, when the SOSUS station 
in Barbados detected a Soviet Hotel/Echo/November (HEN)-class 
submarine as it passed through the Greenland-Iceland-United 
Kingdom (GIUK) gap. 
SOSUS was also proving its value to the aviation-based ASW 
community. Using the cueing from SOSUS and their own 
LOFAR-based sonobuoys, ASW patrol aircraft were becoming 
more effective at tracking adversarial submarines. Coordination 
with SOSUS, however, caused their tactics to undergo a good deal 
of refinement. Detections were being made at much longer ranges, 
and so the area of location uncertainty for the target sub was much 
larger by the time the ASW aircraft arrived at the original 
detection point than had been experienced before. This was 
particularly troubling when attempting to track diesel submarines, 
as they would only be snorkeling for a finite period of time. 
Nuclear submarines and their constant noise signatures made this 
problem much less significant. The growing effectiveness of 
SOSUS continued to spur development of new ASW tactics in the 
coming years. 
 
Bringing the Fight to the Enemy 
The ability to detect and track Soviet submarines almost at 
will emboldened the Navy's vision of ASW operations. In 1965, 
Navy leadership decided to install SOSUS arrays in locations as 
close to the Soviet home waters as possible. This strategy would 
offer as much lead time as possible to position U.S. and Allied 
surface, submarine, and aviation ASW assets to best prosecute the 
coming threat. The Navy began by looking for natural choke 
points where the Soviets would have to transit to reach their open-
ocean patrol areas. An array was built in the Norwegian Sea in 
1964 to watch for submarines leaving their bases on the Kola 





Peninsula, and NavFac Keflavik was established in 1966 to 
supervise the GIUK gap. By 1981, thirty-six stations were keeping 
watch for submarines of the Soviet Union and their allies around 
the world. These barrier stations provided the cueing data needed 
by ASW prosecution vessels. The constant monitoring capability 
of SOSUS reduced the need for ships, subs, and aircraft to 
maintain the barrier watch for Soviet subs. The granting of basing 
rights in places like Rota, Spain and Keflavik, Iceland greatly 
increased the proximity of ASW aircraft to the expected Soviet 
transit lanes. SOSUS also freed up American attack submarines 
(SSNs) to be able to forward deploy in Soviet waters to conduct 
intelligence gathering, as well as provide the first line of defense 
in case hostilities were to break out. 
The need for a permanent advanced warning system was 
highlighted by the deployment of four Soviet Foxtrot-class 
submarines to the Caribbean Sea during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
in October 1962. The detection of one of the Foxtrots by SOSUS 
and its subsequent prosecution by ASW patrol aircraft marked 
another milestone in the program's continuing development. 
(Association, 2010) SOSUS provided the ideal combination of 
round-the-clock watchfulness without alerting the adversary to the 
presence of the sentries. 
 
SOSUS Continues its Evolution 
One of the great concerns of the ASW community, and thus 
one of its primary driving factors, was maintaining its established 
acoustic advantage over the Soviet Navy. Leaders in the 
community predicted that it was a matter of when, not if, the 
Soviets would improve the noise silencing on their submarines to 
eliminate the early-warning capabilities provided by SOSUS. A 
primary focus in maintaining that edge was the continuing 
refinement of acoustic and computing hardware to further enhance 
array and processing gains. 
One of the innovative enhancements to SOSUS was altering 
how it processed the data from its hydrophone strings. Instead of 
linking all the hydrophones on a string into a single array, it was 





determined that splitting the hydrophones into two or even three 
arrays on a given string would still provide an acceptable level of 
acoustic detection. The advantage to this technique is that these 
arrays could be steered to look at separate acoustic arrival paths, 
which helped to resolve the issue with bearing resolution that was 
present when a string was configured as a single array. The 
computers that processed the acoustic data saw continuing 
improvements as well, allowing for frequency spectra to be 
resolved at a finer level. This development of passive acoustic 
detection capability also helped to improve the quieting efforts of 
American submarine designers. (Cote, 2003) 
Navy leadership recognized the vulnerability of SOSUS’s 
passive detection to quieting efforts by the Soviets shortly after the 
system was first implemented. As a means to prevent the 
possibility of future obsolescence, SOSUS designers took up 
where the Herald system left off and tried to develop active echo-
ranging capabilities that would work across entire ocean basins. 
The most notable of these efforts was Project Artemis, which ran 
during the first half of the 1960's. Artemis, like most other large-
scale active echo-ranging systems, had difficulty in developing a 
low frequency active transducer powerful enough to operate over 
the desired ranges. It was also inhibited by an inability to perform 
enough signal processing to account for the effects of reverbera-
tion on the outgoing pulses. Ultimately, the idea of an ocean-wide 
active sonar network was abandoned as unfeasible. In the 
meantime, technological improvement in passive acoustics 
continued. However, the biggest challenges to the viability of 
SOSUS were on the horizon. 
 
SOSUS Meets Its Match 
The 1970's saw the introduction of two significant—and 
different—threats to the ability of SOSUS to fulfill its early-
warning detection role. The first, introduced in 1973, was the 
Delta-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The second, 
introduced in 1978, was the VICTOR III SSN. These two Soviet 
submarines were the harbingers that the days of overwhelming 





U.S. ASW superiority over the Soviet Union were drawing to a 
close. 
The Delta was not a remarkably new design for Soviet SSBNs. 
In fact, it was viewed by American intelligence analysts as yet 
another example of the Soviets failing to improve their quieting 
techniques. One analyst was quoted as saying: 
 
Those of us who are in the technical community had 
staked our reputations on the fact that when the Delta-
class submarine(s) went to sea in 1976 they were going to 
demonstrate a fundamental quieting program, and we said 
that to the rest of the world and they did not do it and we 
lost a lot of credibility. (Cote, 2003) 
 
What made the Delta so formidable to SOSUS was its subma-
rine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which had sufficient range 
to reach the continental United States from the waters in the 
vicinity of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. This meant 
that Soviet SSBNs no longer had to transit through the elaborate 
series of choke points and acoustic barriers to be able to endanger 
the U.S. with their nuclear payload. At the same time, the United 
States publicly declared that one of its first goals upon the 
commencement of hostilities with the USSR would be the 
destruction of all Soviet SSBNs. These two factors—the Delta’s 
long-distance launch capability and the announced targeting of 
their SSBN fleet in the event of hostilities—caused a fundamental 
shift in the strategic and operational policy of the Soviet Union. 
They implemented their bastion strategy, in which their SSBNs 
would conduct their patrols within friendly home waters or under 
the protection of the marginal and permanent Arctic ice. There 
were even reports of Deltas conducting strategic patrols while still 
in port. The bastion strategy meant that U.S. SSNs would have to 
pass through Soviet ASW barriers to reach their prey in the event 
of war. 
Despite this radical shift by the Soviet strategic forces, 
SOSUS could still operate against the other classes of Soviet subs, 





which were still at a noticeable acoustic disadvantage. 1978 was 
another milestone in the improvements to the Soviet submarine 
program. This time, it was the introduction of VICTOR III SSN, a 
measurably quieter nuclear submarine. VICTOR III and its mid-
1980's descendent, the even-quieter AKULA, put the U.S. 
Submarine Force on notice that its acoustic advantage was coming 
to an end. The Victors and Akulas incorporated numerous 
technological improvements, from equipment rafting to improved 
propeller design, to reduce their acoustic signatures. The Akulas, 
in particular, achieved the long sought-after goal of being quiet 
enough to evade detection by SOSUS. These dramatic improve-
ments in acoustic quieting technology were the direct result of the 
classified information collected by SOSUS that was leaked to the 
Soviet Navy by the Walker/Whitworth spy ring. (Whitman, 2005) 
Prior to that compromise of information, U.S. intelligence 
indicated that the Soviet Submarine Force had little indication of 
the degree to which their submarines were acoustically vulnerable. 
Despite the setback, proponents of SOSUS could take some 
comfort in knowing that it would be some time before the rest of 
the Soviet Submarine Force would reach the acoustic silence 
standard set by Akula, if such a program was even feasible for the 
Soviet Union to undertake. 
 
New Life and New Developments 
The Navy was not willing to resign SOSUS to the annals of 
Cold War history. Through efforts led chiefly by Destroyer 
Squadron (DESRON) 31 as it worked to restore its long-dormant 
coordinated ASW skills, operational commanders were given 
more ability to access and incorporate SOSUS and other elements 
of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) into their 
planning and tactical employment. Specifically, DESRON 31 
developed techniques for the reverse cueing of contacts to SOSUS 
operators. This involved sending contact data back to SOSUS 
monitoring stations to prompt their review to look for the vessel in 
question and allowed the operators at sea to take advantage of the 
significantly greater acoustic processing capability of SOSUS base 
stations. 





The 1980's also saw the fielding of two new sonar systems. 
The first was the Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System 
(SURTASS), which was essentially a SOSUS-like array towed 
from a DOD-contracted civilian ship. This array, incorporating the 
use of a low frequency active (LFA) transducer, achieved the goal 
of open-ocean active sonar search envisioned by Project Artemis. 
Further experiments with LFA may be able to incorporate both 
SOSUS and SURTASS arrays as receiving stations to track quiet 
modern submarines. The second new development was the Fixed 
Distributed System (FDS), which used an array of hydrophones 
designed to take advantage of shorter-range direct path acoustic 
signals. These sensors would then be networked together through 
fiber optic cables and routed to an operating station on shore for 
signal processing. The advantage to FDS is that it can be deployed 
in both deep and shallow areas because it does not depend on 
sound propagation through the SOFAR channel. The successor to 
FDS was the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). ADS operated 
in much the same fashion as FDS, except that it was intended to be 
deployed from a ship on an as-needed basis in a forward operating 
area. The development program for ADS was cancelled in 2006, 
though remotely-operated, forward-deployable systems continue 
to be under development. These new systems, now known as 
Distributed Netted Systems (DNS), are taking on an increasingly 
important role in the emerging field of Subsea Warfare. DNS 
perform some of the same monitoring functions as SOSUS, but 
also have more advanced communications capabilities, such as 
being able to communicate directly with ships at sea without a 
shore-based relay station, as well as a growing variety of non-
acoustic sensors.  
The future of SOSUS is likely heading in a much different 
direction from what its designers originally envisioned. While it is 
still considered an important national security asset, the opportu-
nity is also being granted for civilian use of the array and its data 
collection capabilities. SOSUS has been used in several areas of 
research, including seismology, marine mammal migration, and 
looking for global warming trends in oceanographic conditions. 
Users are required to possess a security clearance, as the data is 





still in use by Defense Department personnel, but it provides an 
excellent infrastructure that might not otherwise be feasible for 
development and deployment by research and academic 
institutions. SOSUS has also been used by law enforcement 
personnel, most notably in drug interdiction efforts for over-water 
supply routes from Central and South America.  
 
Conclusion 
SOSUS has had a storied service record over the last fifty-plus 
years, though many of those stories are only recently being 
declassified for public consideration and analysis. It was a 
revolutionary system that provided a significant technological 
advantage to the United States in its conflict with the former 
Soviet Union. For all the secrecy associated with the information it 
provided, SOSUS had a profound impact on the growth and 
development of modern ASW techniques and tactics. It directly 
contributed to the acoustic advantage that the U.S. Submarine 
Force enjoyed for many years, allowing U.S. subs to operate with 
near-impunity in virtually every region of the world with water 
deep enough to accommodate them. Even as SOSUS has been 
pushed towards obsolescence by continuing advances in 
submarine design, such as air-independent propulsion and ultra-
quiet nuclear submarines, its legacy of technological innovation 
has continued. SOSUS continues to be a valuable resource as its 
capabilities are applied to new areas of study, ensuring its 
relevance for years to come. 
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